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7.1  Introduction 
By the end of the eighties and early nineties government deficits and public 
debt in relation to GDP had increased to a higher level than before in nearly 
all OECD countries. Alesina and Perotti (1995) analyze this development of 
public debt in OECD countries and deduce two stylized questions that a theo- 
retical explanation should capture: (i) Why are there large and persistent de- 
ficits in peacetime, and why  now? (ii) Why do deficits and debt differ sig- 
nificantly  between  countries? The  authors  survey  the  existing  theoretical 
explanations of  public debt and establish that only a few political-economic 
models accord with the facts of increased public debt. The tax-smoothing the- 
ory of the government budget (see Barro 1979) that presents the government 
as a “benevolent social planner” maximizing the utility of  a representative 
agent does not, for example, answer those two questions. It can explain neither 
the high public debt in the eighties nor the large cross-country differences, 
although it is compatible with the increase of debt as a result of the 1973-74 
recession. Much the same holds with the fiscal illusion theory of  Buchanan 
and Wagner (1977). However, similar verdicts can be brought forward against 
theories that rely on several political sources of  time inconsistency,’ partisan 
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theories,2 and theories of  intergenerational redi~tribution.~  According  to the 
analysis of Alesina and Perotti, there exist only two classes of models that are 
able to address the two stylized questions mentioned above: on the one hand, 
models in which governments use public debt strategically to commit future 
governments?  and, on the other hand, models of  distributional conflict  and 
“wars of attriti~n.”~ 
Recently, Velasco (chap. 2 in this volume) has developed a dynamic model 
of government net assets as the common property of all fiscal authorities. Sev- 
eral interest groups or the different spending ministries attempt to get money 
from this common resource in order to finance policies benefiting the prefer- 
ences of  their  group  members  or  constituencies. Then  a dynamic  problem 
arises that is similar to the “tragedy of the commons” (see Hardin  1968). The 
problem of a fiscal commons consists in the fact that each of the n agents uses 
the whole stock of resources and not one-nth of it as a basis for consumption 
or spending decisions. 
Given the facts of  increasing public deficits and debt as a fiscal commons 
and the arguments brought forward that serious failures of  political markets 
tend to create such deficits, two institutional possibilities to reduce deficits and 
debt may be proposed. Buchanan and Wagner (1977), for example, demand 
formal  (constitutional)  fiscal  restraints.  However,  as  the  German  example 
shows, formal fiscal restraints even on the constitutional level do not necessar- 
ily prevent federal public debt from growing.6 Recently, several authors have 
analyzed the conditions that most probably lead to binding balanced-budget 
rules.’ Bohn and Inman (1996) provide a comprehensive empirical analysis on 
the different designs of formal fiscal constraints. They find that in order to be 
effective deficit constraints must require a balanced budget at the end of the 
fiscal year, not just in prospect at the beginning (no-carry-over rule). Further- 
more,  balanced-budget  rules  must  be  grounded  constitutionally  rather  than 
merely based on statutes. Another factor that matters is the enforcement  of 
balanced-budget rules: Of the 36 U.S. states with a no-carry-over rule, the 15 
whose supreme courts are appointed by the state’s legislature or governor had 
larger deficits than the 21 states whose supreme courts are elected directly by 
the voters. Finally, the balanced-budget rule must be difficult to amend. 
As von Hagen (1991) has shown for the U.S. states, formal fiscal restraints 
give incentives to policymakers to increase off-budget activities.8 Thus, in con- 
2. Tabellini and LaVia (1989) report empirical evidence that deficits in the United States were 
3. See Cukierman and Meltzer 1989 and Tabellini 1991. 
4. See, e.g., Shachar 1993 or, for local governments, Rosenberg 1992. 
5. See, e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991, as well as Drazen and Grilli 1993. 
6. Art.  11  5 (I) of  the German Grundgesetz demands that, except for major macroeconomic 
disequilibria, federal net borrowing not be higher than investment expenditure of the federal level. 
7. See Alesina and Bayoumi 1996; Alt and Lowry  1994; Eichengreen and von Hagen  1996; 
Poterba  1994,  1995a,  1995b; von  Hagen  and Eichengreen  1996; and  the surveys in  Poterba 
1996, 1997. 
8. For the ineffectiveness of constitutional limitations in the case of U.S. states see also Kiewiet 
and Szakaly 1996. 
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trast to this rather outcome-oriented institutional solution, von Hagen (1992) 
and von  Hagen and Harden (1994, 1995) have analyzed whether budgetary 
procedures have an impact on the level of government expenditure and budget 
deficits. According to their results the following features reduce the spending 
bias: (i) a strong position of the prime minister or finance minister in the nego- 
tiation process of the budget within the government before the budget law has 
passed, or government negotiations producing a set of binding targets early in 
that process; (ii) a parliamentary process with strong limits on amendments, 
line-item voting on expenditures, and an “all-or-nothing” vote on the total size 
of the budget preceding the parliamentary debate; (iii) a large degree of trans- 
parency of the budget; (iv) a limited spending flexibility for the ministries and 
a strong position of the finance minister vis-a-vis the spending ministers in the 
execution process of the budget law. All in all, “top down” procedures work 
better than “bottom up”  procedure^.^ 
In these theoretical as well as empirical studies another institutional possi- 
bility of  debt control has been neglected as an independent rule: Voters may 
have the possibility to vote on budget deficits in referenda. Buchanan (1958, 
1987) supposed that democratic governments, either direct or representative, 
entail a bias for borrowing because voters favor current benefits but dislike 
taxes. Therefore he suggests constitutional constraints. Inman (1982) argued 
that fiscal limitations are potentially valuable policy tools when direct demo- 
cratic review (or a Tiebout-like exit process) does not adequately control gov- 
ernment behavior. Moak, however, considers direct democracy as the only reli- 
able safeguard against excessive indebtedness (1982, 114). If  voters acted as 
fiscal conservatives, as Peltzman (1992) in an empirical study of U.S. elections 
has impressively shown, they would be more reluctant to increase public debt. 
Indeed, because referenda and initiatives reduce the political leeway of  the 
government, elements of  direct democracy may also reduce the strategic use 
of public debt: governments and parties then have fewer opportunities to follow 
the special interests of their constituencies. More basically, the principal-agent 
problem inherent in (more or less) representative democracies becomes less 
severe once referenda and/or initiatives are available for citizens.  lo 
Using Swiss (Pommerehne 1978, 1990) and US. data (Matsusaka 1995), 
researchers have derived empirical results concerning the relationship between 
direct democracy and the economy. First, government expenditure is-ceteris 
paribus-lower  in direct than in representative democracy (see also Holcombe 
1980). Second, the structure of  public expenditure changes with respect to 
different institutional regimes. The existence of the initiative leads to a reduc- 
tion in the state, as well as an increase in the local, component of  state and 
local spending. Third, with respect to revenue composition direct democracies 
9. De Haan and Sturm (1994) are able to confirm these results under ceteris paribus conditions 
for European Union (EU) member states during the eighties. These confirming results are, how- 
ever, obtained by excluding Luxembourg from their panel data set. 
10.  See Matsusaka  1992; Matsusaka  and McCarty  1997; as  well as Romer and Rosenthal 
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rely more on charges than on broad-based  taxes. Fourth,  Pommerehne and 
Weck-Hannemann (1  996) show that the willingness to finance government is 
higher in cantons with a direct than in those with a representative democratic 
system, indicating more efficient revenue collection. Fifth, some public goods 
are produced more efficiently in direct democracies than in representative de- 
mocracies."  Sixth, economic performance,  as measured by  GDP per capita 
is-ceteris  paribus-higher  in those Swiss cantons with direct than in those 
with representative democracies (see Feld and Savioz 1997). Finally, Kiewiet 
and Szakaly (1996) show for a panel of  the U.S. states from  1961 to  1990 
that referendum approval of guaranteed debt is the most effective restraint on 
state borrowing. 
In this paper, we thus attempt to find clues in the actual experience of Swit- 
zerland whether and which budgetary procedures have an impact on public 
debt. The variation in Swiss budgetary procedures and direct democratic deci- 
sion making between municipalities and between states (cantons) is consider- 
able. Switzerland is one of  the few industrial countries (and presumably the 
only European one) where it is possible to study the effect of  institutional 
differences on the level of government deficits and public debt. In section 7.2 
the institutional variety of  Switzerland is described. In section 7.3 a spatial 
model is outlined in order to illustrate the restrictions imposed on representa- 
tives by  the voters in a referendum. An econometric model is developed and 
empirically estimated using data on Swiss municipalities in section 7.4. The 
paper finishes with some concluding remarks (sec. 7.5). 
7.2  Budgetary Procedures at Swiss Subfederal Levels 
Switzerland's constitution combines elements of direct democracy  with a 
high degree of federalism. It consists of three governmental levels that estab- 
lish strong fiscal competencies of the single states (cantons) and local govern- 
ment units. Although fiscal competencies of the different tiers of government 
are not the focus of this paper, they are worth mentioning. The main progres- 
sive taxes on personal  and corporate income are state and local taxes. The 
cantons have the basic power to tax income and capital. The municipalities can 
levy a surcharge on cantonal direct and property taxes. The central government 
relies mainly on indirect (proportional) taxes, the general sales tax and specific 
consumption taxes like the mineral  oil tax. There is, however, a small but 
highly progressive federal income tax, which amounts to 25 percent of total 
federal tax revenue in  1994, while the cantons and municipalities rely on in- 
come and property taxes for about 50 percent of their total revenue and 95 
percent of their tax revenue. The federal income tax has a maximal marginal 
tax rate of  13.2 percent and an average tax rate of  11.5 percent. Owing to a 
11. Pommerehne (1983) analyzes refuse collection in Swiss municipalities and shows that the 
costs of production are the lowest in direct democratic municipalities with a private supplier. 155  Public Debt and Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? 
basic tax exemption, the highest 3 percent of income taxpayers pay 50 percent 
of the revenue of the federal income tax. The federal government can also rely 
on a source tax  on income from interest, the so-called Verrechnungssteuel: 
There are systems of  horizontal and vertical fiscal equalization, mainly con- 
sisting of matching grants, as well as regional policies. However, the system is 
not as generous as, for example, in Germany: The share of own revenue from 
all government revenue ranges from 65 percent to 99.8 percent in our sample 
of  137 Swiss municipalities. 
Concerning elements of direct democracy, the Swiss constitution includes a 
constitutional initiative and obligatory and optional referenda on the federal 
level, but no legislative initiative. A constitutional initiative requires 100,000 
signatures (2.2 percent of the voters in 1994), an optional referendum 50,000 
signatures (1.1 percent of the voters in 1994). Since the share of required signa- 
tures from all votes has declined from 7.5 percent (1893) to 2.2 percent (1994) 
in the case of  the constitutional initiative and from 4.7 percent (1  879) to 1.1 
percent (1994) in the case of the optional referendum, the number of executed 
initiatives and optional referenda has substantially risen during the last hun- 
dred years (Kleinewefers 1995). Only once, in  1977, after women's  right to 
vote was established in 1971 (on the federal level), did voters increase the sig- 
nature requirement in a referendum, bringing it back to its original time trend. 
At the federal level, the Swiss political system continually developed toward 
a higher degree of  direct democracy during the first hundred years after the 
constitution of  1848, which already established a constitutional initiative (on 
total revision of the constitution) and an obligatory referendum on constitu- 
tional changes.'* Thiirer (1992) argues that the development of  direct demo- 
cratic institutions at the central level in Switzerland follows a trend over time 
toward more popular participation. In  1874 the optional referendum on laws 
was introduced. In 189  1 an initiative on partial revision of the constitution was 
established. In 1921 the referendum on international treaties (extended in 1977 
to the joining of international organizations) and in 1949 an obligatory referen- 
dum on urgent, universally binding federal decisions were introduced in the 
constitution. Several attempts to introduce a legislative initiative at the federal 
level and thus to increase the possibilities for popular participation were re- 
jected (1950, 1958, 1972). Most recently, a committee is collecting signatures 
for an initiative aimed at introducing a constructive referendum (a referendum 
with counterproposal) at the central level. 
Since 1949 there have  also been slight changes in the creation and use of 
12. See Luthardt 1994. Sometimes direct democracy in Switzerland is attributed to the political 
self-organization of Swiss citizens in townships and villages by  local assemblies comparable to 
the U.S.  town meetings. The constitutional changes in the nineteenth century appear to have devel- 
oped from the Middle Ages with elements of direct democracy carried over to modem times as 
the institutions of referendum and initiative. We start the description of the history of Swiss direct 
democracy in the nineteenth century, however, because it is more profoundly analyzed than the 
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referenda and initiatives in the cantons and municipalities of Switzerland, al- 
though they are rather minor and do not always aim at more direct democracy. 
Referenda and initiatives are institutions with a widespread though varying use 
at those levels. On the state level, we find the whole spectrum from the classic 
assembly in some cantons, like the two Appenzell, Glarus, and Obwalden, to 
more representative democracies in others, like Neuchatel. The same disper- 
sion is found at the local level. In some cantons and municipalities the obliga- 
tory and optional referenda include more issues than in others; some establish 
a legislative initiative in addition to the constitutional initiative, others do not. 
Much the same holds with respect to budgetary procedures. Some cantons, 
like St. Gallen, rely on more stringent procedural rules than others. Some can- 
tons allow for participation of voters in the budgetary process in a referendum 
on the budget draft, the tax rate, or the budget deficit. Other cantons give the 
secretary of  finance a stronger position  in  the budgetary  process, while yet 
others decide on the budget in a meeting of the heads of all spending depart- 
ments. Thus, the question whether a “top down” or a “bottom up” budgetary 
procedure leads to more favorable results  should become answerable in the 
Swiss institutional setting. 
The focus of  our analysis is on the local level only. Swiss municipalities 
have a much greater variation in budgetary  decision-making  processes than 
cantons do. Our data set includes 131 of the 137 largest Swiss towns and com- 
munities, whose population  ranges between approximately 400,000 and ap- 
proximately 3,000  person^.'^ Table 7.1 sketches the distribution of those mu- 
nicipalities within the 26 cantons and the percentage of the cantonal population 
that lives in them. Nearly 46 percent of the Swiss population lives in these 137 
municipalities. Cantons that include relatively large towns like Zurich or typi- 
cal city-states like Basel-Stadt or Genkve have a higher municipal populational 
fraction in our data set. Small cantons that are situated in the mountainous 
areas and have a higher share of  rural population are somewhat underrepre- 
sented. This sample selection also influences the variation and distribution of 
budgetary decision making since Swiss rural municipalities, for example, by 
having local assemblies, make more use of direct democratic decision making 
on the average than larger m~nicipalities.’~ 
Table 7.2 contains information on the extent of direct democratic budgetary 
decision making reported as the mean of the municipalities of the respective 
canton and descriptive statistics for the different language areas of  Switzer- 
13. We have not yet received data from the municipalities of Diibendorf (ZH), Baar (ZG),  Onex 
(GE), Wetzikon (ZH), Cham (ZG),  and Locarno (TI). These communities, which count only for 
1.37 percent of the Swiss population, therefore had to be excluded from our sample. 
14. One reason is that the larger the population of a community is, the smaller the benefits of 
participating and, therefore, the participation rate in local assemblies. (For empirical evidence in 
the canton Basel-Landschaft see Kirchgassner and Pommerehne  1978.) Correspondingly, on the 
state level, assemblies exist only in very small cantons, and they are sometimes contested today. 
Nevertheless, using the instruments of referenda and initiatives, direct democracy is also handled 
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Table 7.1  Population in Swiss Municipalities with Respect to Their 
State (Canton) 
Population in % 
Number of  of Population 
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land. The first column reports whether there is an obligatory referendum, an 
optional referendum, or a local assembly on the budget draft. The second col- 
umn indicates whether the tax rate is controlled by the voters in an obligatory 
referendum, an  optional referendum, or a local assembly. The last column 
shows whether especially the budget deficit is controlled by the citizens in an 
obligatory referendum, an optional referendum, or a local assembly. 
The latter information is graphically presented in figure 7.1, showing a map 
of  Switzerland, the abbreviations for the cantons used in table 7.1, and the 
language border between the German and French (line 1) and the German and 
Italian (line 2) language areas of Switzerland. French-speaking Switzerland is 
the smaller area in the west of the map, while the Italian-speaking area consists 
of Ticino and parts of the canton of Graubunden in the south of  Switzerland. 
Those cantons in which the majority of  municipalities in our sample has no 
direct democratic decisions over the budget deficit are captured by  the white 
(unshaded) area. Note that figure 7.1 does not capture direct democracy at the Table 7.2  Direct Democracy in Switzerland 
Mean of Cantonal Municipalities 
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= 1 if the budget draft is controlled by the voters in an obligatory referendum, an optional 
referendum, or a local assembly. 
bD = 1 if the tax rate is controlled by the voters in an obligatory referendum, an optional referen- 
dum, or a local assembly. 
'D = 1 if the budget deficit is separately controlled by the voters in an obligatory referendum, an 
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Fig. 7.1 
on budget deficits 
Cantons with majority of municipalities using referenda 
cantonal level but the cantonal average of the municipalities concerning only 
a single aspect of direct legislation. Figure 7.1 shows that the Latin-speaking 
municipalities are more often directly controlled by  the voters in the case of 
the budget deficit than the German-speaking municipalities (mean,  = 0.54 
versus mean,  = 0.90). As table 7.2 shows, however, German-speaking munici- 
palities have more direct democracy with respect to the budget draft and the 
tax rate than the French- and Italian-speaking municipalities. The mean of the 
dummy variable on budget draft is 0.79 in German- and 0.68 in Latin-speaking 
municipalities (mean of the 137 municipalities = 0.76), while the means of 
the dummy on the tax rate are 0.85 and 0.79, respectively (mean of the 137 
municipalities = 0.83). 
In jurisdictions where voters are directly involved in the budgetary process, 
they usually enter the process at the later stages. First, the budget is drafted in 
the local executives either by  the bureau of  the secretary of  finance or the 
mayor or by the different spending bureaus. Second, it is discussed in the exec- 
utive until a final budget draft is presented to the local parliaments (or directly 
to the voters in a few cases). After the draft has passed the legislature and has 
been amended by the executive according to the legislative requirements, it is 
presented to the voters for final approval either after a proposal of the voters in Table 7.3  Structure of Negotiations within Government 
Mean of Cantonal Municipalities 
Canton 
~  ~~ 
General  Agenda  Scope of  Structure of 
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”General constraint: no general constraint = 0; constraint on debt in relation to nominal GDP = 
1; constraint on debt in relation to nominal GDP and deficit in relation to nominal GDP = 2; 
constraint on government spending in relation to nominal GDP or “Golden Rule” = 3; constraint 
on government spending and deficit in relation to nominal GDP = 4. 161  Public Debt and Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? 
Table 7.3  (continued) 
bAgenda setting for budget negotiations: secretary of finance (SF) or “cabinet” collects bids from 
heads of  departments = 0; SF or “cabinet” collects bids  subject to preagreed guidelines = 1; 
“cabinet” decides on budget norms first = 2; SF proposes budget norms to be voted on by the 
“cabinet” = 3; SF or mayor determines budget parameters to be observed by  heads of depart- 
ments = 4. 
‘Scope of budget norms in the setting of agenda: expenditure or deficit = 0; specific budget tar- 
gets = 1.33; specific together with overall limits on the budget size = 2.66; “broad,” i.e., overall 
limits on the budget size = 4. 
dStructure  of negotiations: all “cabinet members” involved together = 0; multilateral = 2; bilateral 
between heads of departments and SF = 4. 
an optional referendum or because the budgetary process requires an obliga- 
tory referendum. In some municipalities, the budget deficit has to be approved 
by the voters separately; that is, the budget deficit is not only reported in the 
budget draft but also annexed on a different ballot sheet. Thus, the budget 
deficit has to be agreed upon by  the voters in a way  similar to the separate 
decision on tax rate changes. 
We  measure budgetary procedures of Swiss municipalities not only by  the 
extent of direct democratic decision making on the budget, but also by  more 
or less the same indices of procedures as von Hagen (1992,69-74). Von Hagen 
builds a structural index and an index of  long-term planning constraint that 
consists of  five different items in the budgetary process: (i) the structure of 
negotiations within government, (ii) the structure of the parliamentary process, 
(iii) the informativeness of the budget draft, (iv) the flexibility of the budget 
execution, and (v) the long-term planning constraint. The information we re- 
ceived from the Swiss municipalities has not allowed us to get exactly the same 
information about the structure of parliamentary process and the flexibility of 
budget execution. Thus, the structure of  negotiations within government is 
characterized in our data by the following issues, shown in table 7.3 as cantonal 
means  of  the  municipalities and  descriptives for  the  two  Swiss language 
areas.I5 
The existence of a general constraint indicates that the draft begins with the 
statement of overall restrictions or targets on total spending, revenues, deficits, 
or government debt. General constraints are not used frequently as means to 
discipline municipalities in Switzerland. Only in the cantons of Fribourg, Ap- 
penzell Ausser Rhoden, Valais, and Genbve are municipalities more strongly 
restricted by  such formal constraints than in other cantons. In some of these 
cantons, municipalities facing severe budgetary problems get grants from the 
cantonal fiscal equalization scheme only if those local decision-making bodies 
agree to raise their local tax rates in order to reduce deficits and debt. This has 
been treated in the data underlying table 7.3 as the strongest general constraint. 
The agenda setting for budget negotiations reflects whether the initial budget 
15. Information on the details of these indices is provided in the notes to tables 7.3-7.5. 162  Lars P.  Feld and Gebhard Kirchgassner 
guidelines are set by  the mayor or secretary of finance or by the heads of the 
different departments. Agenda-setting power of a central authority in the budg- 
etary process varies considerably between the municipalities and the different 
cantons. A particular pattern is observable only to a limited extent. The small 
cantons of  Schwyz, Glarus, Appenzell Ausser Rhoden, and Appenzell Inner 
Rhoden have average values of their municipalities that are low, which indi- 
cates a weak role for the agenda setter. Agenda-setting power of the secretary 
of finance or the mayor is only slightly higher in Latin-speaking municipalities 
(mean = 2.14) than in German-speaking ones (mean = 1.97). The agenda may 
specify the scope of budget norms, that is, overall limits on the budget size, 
limits on spending or deficits, or it may determine specific budget targets to- 
gether with one of the former limits. The scope of budget norms does not vary 
much over the municipalities in the sample except for the canton of Zurich. 
Subsequent negotiations may be structured bi- or multilaterally between the 
secretary of  finance and the heads of  the departments or contain the whole 
“cabinet.” The structure of negotiations within government appears to be more 
centralized and “top down” in Latin-speaking municipalities (mean = 2.06) 
than in the German-speaking ones (mean = 1.87). 
Table 7.4 contains information on the informativeness of the budget. It gives 
some answers on the budgetary treatment of special funds, that is, whether 
they are included in the budget or whether the municipality engages in consid- 
erable off-budget activities. The inclusion of special funds in the budget is 
higher in German-speaking (mean = 2.25) than in Latin-speaking Switzerland 
(mean = 2.00).  Another interesting fact is that off-budget activities appear to be 
most prevalent in the municipalities of the two city cantons of Basel-Stadt and 
Genkve. Basel-Stadt, for example, mixes up cantonal and municipal budgets 
such that a consistent separation between both becomes difficult. Furthermore, 
the table shows whether the budget is submitted in one  comprehensive document 
or split up in different parts, for example, different documents for revenue and 
expenditure or for different policy domains, which make it difficult to estimate 
the overall effect of the budget and allow for common-pool problems. Particu- 
larly the municipalities of the smaller cantons, but also those from the cantons 
of Ticino, Basel-Landschaft, Schaffhausen, and Jura hardly submit any com- 
prehensive document. After 1990, many of the Swiss municipalities introduced 
the so-called New Accounting  Model, where the comprehensiveness  of the 
budget document is a central requirement. Some municipalities introduced it 
earlier. This may also explain variations in this issue. Finally, table 7.4 contains 
information on the transparency of the budget. This is an overall judgment on 
the informativeness, for example, whether expenditures are broken down by 
function and administrative responsibility, or revenues are presented in a break- 
down by source. This issue again reveals the differences in the introduction of 
the New Accounting Model in Swiss local budgets. Again, some municipali- 
ties, particularly in the German-speaking cantons, introduce these new require- 
ments more slowly. The extent to which government loans to nongovernment Table 7.4  Informativeness  of the Budget Draft 
Canton 
~~  ~ 
Mean of Cantonal Municipalities 
Special  One 
Funds'  Documentb  Transparencyc 
Zurich (ZH)  2.318  1.455  2.455 
Bern (BE)  2.47 1  1.294  2.706 
Luzern (LU)  2.429  1.7 14  2.857 
Uri (UR)  2.000  0.000  2.000 
Schwyz (SZ)  3.667  4.000  4.000 
Obwalden (OW) 
Nidwalden (NW)  2.000  0.000  2.000 
Glarus (GL)  2.000  0.000  2.000 
Zug (ZG)  1.000  0.000  2.000 
Fribourg (FR)  2.000  0.667  2.000 
Solothum (SO)  1.667  0.000  2.000 
Basel-Stadt (BS)  0.500  2.000  3.000 
Basel-Landschaft (BL)  1.750  0.000  1.750 
Schaffnausen (SH)  2.000  0.000  2.000 
Appenzell a. Rh. (AR)  2.000  0.000  2.000 
Appenzell i. Rh. (AI)  2.000  0.000  2.000 
St. Gallen (SG)  2.250  1.500  2.500 
Graubunden (GR)  2.500  1.000  2.500 
Aargau (AG)  2.375  1.500  2.750 
Thurgau (TG)  2.600  1.600  2.400 
Ticino (TI)  1.333  0.000  2.000 
Vaud (VD)  2.750  2.000  3.000 
Valais (VS)  2.000  0.000  2.000 
Neuchltel (NE)  2.250  1.000  2.000 
Jura (JU)  2.000  0.000  2.000 
Mean  2.183  1.282  2.534 
Median  2.000  O.Oo0  2.000 
Standard deviation  1.142  1.858  1.105 
Genkve (GE)  0.571  2.857  3.429 
All municipalities 
Range  4.000  4.000  4.000 
German speaking 
Mean  2.253  1.200  2.484 
Median  2.000  0.000  2.000 
Standard deviation  1.081  1.831  1.080 
Range  4.000  4.000  4.000 
Mean  2.000  1.500  2.667 
Median  2.000  0.000  2.000 
Standard deviation  1.287  1.935  1.171 
Range  4.000  4.000  4.000 
French and Italian speaking 
aSpecial funds: not included in the budget draft (considerable off-budget activities) = 0; some 
special funds are included = 1; most special funds are included = 2; special funds are included, 
but annexed to budget draft = 3; special funds are included in the budget draft = 4. 
bBudget  submitted in one document or in different documents: no (different documents for revenue 
and expenditure or for different policy domains) = 0; in recent times submitted in one document = 
2; submitted in one document = 4. 
'Assessment of budget transparency, i.e., expenditures broken down by function and administrative 
responsibility or revenues presented in a breakdown by  source: hardly transparent = 0; not fully 
transparent = 2; fully transparent = 4. 164  Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgassner 
entities as well as links to national accounts statistics are revealed in the budget 
draft were reported only by a few municipalities and thus had to be skipped. 
The municipalities have also provided some insight into the nature of long- 
term planning constraints at the local level. Table 7.5 contains some informa- 
tion on the existence of a multiannual target or projections of intertemporal 
guidelines of their budget plans, the length of the planning horizon, the kind 
of forecasts used-that  is, on what basis these forecasts are derived, ad hoc, 
fixed, updated, or by using a macroeconomic model-and  the degree of com- 
mitment that is connected to the multiannual plan. The commitment may only 
express political preferences and the willingness to make efforts to come close 
to these targets, without, however, being binding. The targets may also be only 
indicative in that they carry less weight than a political commitment. They may 
be part of a coalition agreement, only for internal orientation or more specific 
on total government revenue and expenditures. The long-term planning con- 
straint shows that German-speaking municipalities are more constrained. The 
target exists more often, the nature of  the forecast is more reliable, and the 
commitment connected with it is stronger. Only the planning horizon is longer 
in Latin-speaking Switzerland. However, again the municipalities of smaller 
cantons have less often introduced long-term planning constraints, as the fig- 
ures for the municipalities of the cantons of Schwyz, Nidwalden, Zug, Appen- 
zell Aussen Rhoden, and Appenzell Inner Rhoden show. Again, some of these 
differences are caused by differences in the introduction of  the New Account- 
ing Model, which does not require the introduction of long-term planning tar- 
gets but recommends it as a basis for rational budgetary planning. 
7.3  A Spatial Model 
The budgetary process in Swiss municipalities with referendum approval of 
the budget deficit can be analyzed in a similar, but more stylized manner, as 
Inman (1 997) does in a general paper. Consider a budget game where agents 
prefer different levels of budget deficits d up to a maximum limit on deficits 
d,,,  that is set by capital markets. Deficits that exceed d,,,  are not funded by 
the market. Suppose that the executive prefers a public deficit level d, that is 
higher than the one preferred by parliament, d,.  The latter prefers deficits that 
exceed the deficit level preferred by the voters, d,  ,  such that d,,,,  >  d, >  d,  > 
dv.  The budgetary process outlined above corresponds to a multistage budget 
game illustrated by the following spatial mode1.l6 
The agents in figure 7.2 decide on two issues XI and X, that may represent 
two different spending categories. Let X,  represent public infrastructure and 
X, public education spending. A movement along the axis corresponds to an 
increase in spending. The level as well as the structure of  spending determines 
16. The model develops Moser’s (1996) and Feld’s (1997) applications to the Swiss political 
system further and applies it to referenda on budget deficits. Table 7.5  Long-Term Planning Constraints 
Canton 
Mean of Cantonal Municipalities 
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0.591  0.773 
0.529  0.471 
1.857  1.571 
1.000  2.000 
0.333  0.667 
0.000  0.000 
1  .000  2.000 
O.Oo0  0.000 
0.000  0.000 
0.000  0.000 
0.000  0.000 
0.375  0.250 
0.000  0.000 
0.000  0.000 
0.000  0.000 
0.125  0.250 
0.250  0.500 
0.375  0.500 
0.400  0.800 
0.000  0.000 
0.000  0.000 
0.200  0.400 
0.750  1.250 
0.714  1.429 
0.500  1.000 
0.443  0.573 
0.Ooo  0.000 
0.843  0.928 
3.000  3.000 
0.484  0.589 
0.000  0.000 
0.909  0.951 
3.000  3  .000 
0.333  0.528 
0.000  0.000 
0.632  0.878 
3  ,000  2.000 
'Multiannual  target: no multiannual target = 0; multiannual targets on government spending or 
government revenue = 2; multiannual targets on total budget size = 4. 
bPlanning horizon (years): one year = 0; two years = 1; three years = 2; four years = 3; five 
years = 4. 
<Kind  of forecast used: ad hoc forecast = 0; fixed forecast = 1; updated forecast, but not based 
on a consistent macromodel = 2; updated forecast on the basis of a consistent macromodel = 3. 
dDegree  of commitment: internal orientation = 0; indicative = 1; weak political = 2; strong politi- 
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Fig. 7.2  The impact of referenda on the level of public deficits 
the level of public  deficit^.'^ Suppose the budget is balanced if the combina- 
tions of XI and X,  represented by  the budget constraint are realized. Infrastruc- 
tural and educational spending exceeding the budget constraint induces public 
deficits that are higher the farther away from the constraint a combination of 
X, and X, is located in the northeast of  figure 7.2.18  Agents have  respective 
ideal or bliss positions represented by  the points  1 to 4.  For simplicity we 
assume that agents evaluate deviations from their bliss points equally, so there 
are common indifference circles around the bliss points. The interests of the 
government and the parliament differ from each other because they represent 
different constituencies. Suppose for example that government and parliament 
are elected in two separate election processes, like the U.S. Congress and the 
U.S. president, or the governments and parliaments of Swiss cantons and mu- 
nicipalities.I9  The interests of representatives and voters differ from each other 
because the decisions in municipal parliaments and governments differ among 
the different parties (ideologies). They may represent a smaller (or larger) frac- 
tion of constituent interests than is needed to gain a majority of voters in a ref- 
erendum. 
Suppose point P represents the status quo of  a polity. In  the jurisdiction, 
17. The structure of spending increases the deficit level because local deficits can be incurred 
mainly in the capital budget, which contains investment in infrastructure to a larger extent than 
educational spending. This rule is enforced at the Swiss local level to differing degrees. 
18. The maximal possible public deficit funded by  the capital market, d,,.,  is not shown in 
figure 7.2 in order not to overload it. It would be located as a budget line in the northeast of point Q. 
19. In this situation the government and the president are elected directly by the voters and not 
by the parliaments. A situation where there are two separately elected chambers like the Senate 
and the House in the United States or the Swiss Nationalrat and the Swiss Standerat is also met 
by the assumptions of the model. 167  Public Debt and Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? 
points 1 and 2 are the bliss points of the government and the parliament, re- 
spectively, while points 3 and 4 are the bliss points of two groups of voters that 
are necessary for a majority in a referendum on budget deficits. Point 1 thus 
corresponds to a public deficit of d, and point 2 to a deficit of dp,  such that d, 
>  d,. Suppose that the government is elected for four years and is not restricted 
by a referendum. The government and the parliament follow their own interests 
to the extent that political protest does not occur and this issue does not de- 
crease reelection prospects dramatically. First, the government moves and pro- 
poses a budget with a deficit d,. Second, the parliament moves and requires 
amendments that restrict the level of budget deficits to a point closer to d,  than 
d,. The government and the parliament agree after the first two stages of  the 
game to propose a budget deficit that is aimed at increasing deficits above the 
level of the status quo P. They would propose a combination of educational 
and infrastructural spending and thus a public deficit within the lens drawn by 
the points P and Q,  that is, point A as a compromise. The interests of the two 
groups of voters 3 and 4 are not considered in this outcome because they do 
not have the possibility of exerting voice. If  they can influence the outcome, 
voters will prefer the status quo P. 
This can be seen from the following: If  a referendum approval of  public 
deficits were allowed as the final stage of the budget game, the representatives’ 
proposal would only be accepted by the median voters of groups 3 and 4 as a 
majority of voters, if it were close enough to their bliss points. If only group 3 
is necessary to gain a majority of voters, the possible outcomes of  the game 
are reduced to the shaded lens in the lower half of figure 7.2. The group of 
voters represented by point 4 changes the possible outcomes to the shaded lens 
in the upper half of figure 7.2 close to the bliss point of the executive. If both 
groups are necessary to win a deficit referendum, the status quo P cannot be 
changed. The status quo P  thus corresponds to dv,  such that d, > dp > dv: 
A referendum prevents the government from implementing a self-interested 
spending policy inducing higher public deficits.*O This model implies the fol- 
lowing hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS  1. Budget deficits in a representative democracy without deficit 
referenda and  a  representative  democracy  with deficit  referenda differ 
from each other to the extent that representatives are able to  follow a self- 
interested fiscal policy. 
To the extent one follows Peltzman (1992) and Moak (1982) in their assess- 
ment that voters are fiscally conservative and prefer lower public deficits than 
representatives, one would expect that public deficits are lower in jurisdictions 
with deficit referenda than in those without referenda. To the extent one follows 
20. In this spatial model it would also be possible to show the different impact of  an  optional 
and obligatory referendum as well as an initiative that shifts the agenda-setting power to the voters. 
In all these cases the ideal working of  the direct democratic elements is assumed; it.,  referenda 
are costlessly possible. 168  Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgassner 
Buchanan (1958, 1987) in his assessment of  a bias of  voters for borrowing, 
public deficits might even be higher in jurisdictions with deficit referenda than 
in those without referenda. 
However, the impact of  referenda on budget deficits and public debt does 
not necessarily have to rely on fiscal conservatism of voters and thus their pref- 
erences. If  public budgets were common-property resources and public debt 
the policy outcome of  a “tragedy of fiscal commons,” as Velasco (chap. 2 in 
this volume) has shown, elements of direct democracy would reduce the dan- 
ger of n agents overusing the fiscal commons. Remember the basic mechanism 
leading to a commons dilemma in budgetary decision making: The problem of 
a fiscal commons consists in the fact that each of the n agents uses the whole 
stock of resources and not one-nth of it as a basis for consumption or spending 
decisions. Each agent attempts to get an optimal level of  resources out of the 
fiscal commons by  optimizing according to hisher individual yield and indi- 
vidual costs. In a referendum situation agent n faces a different optimization 
problem. He/she can only decide how the level of the common fiscal resource 
is distributed among the different budgetary projects. Agent n faces the con- 
straint that the other n -  1 agents extract fiscal resources as well and optimizes 
hisher profit by considering the actions of others. This reasoning implies hy- 
pothesis 2: 
HYPOTHESIS  2. Budget dejicits andpublic debt are lower in a representative 
democracy with dejicit referenda than in a representative democracy with- 
out dejicit referenda. 
7.4  An Econometric Model 
All in all the arguments made above appear to indicate that direct democratic 
elements as well as a strong role of the finance minister reduce the possibilities 
of representatives incumng public debt. However, they do not give any insight 
into whether “top down” (strong finance minister) or “bottom up” (strong role 
of  voters) budgetary procedures are more efficient in the reduction of public 
debt. In  order to test this comparative relationship empirically we  develop 
an econometric model inspired by  the models of  Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 
1989b) and de Haan and Sturm (1994). The dependent variable is debt per 
capita.*’ 
As higher income may reduce the level of public debt, mean income is intro- 
duced as an explanatory variable. Due to lack of local GDP data, mean income 
is defined by total taxable income divided by the number of taxpayers. Thus, it 
also makes sense to normalize public debt by  using the number of taxpayers 
instead of the number of inhabitants as the population measure of the size of a 
21. We use public debt instead of deficits because debt is the accumulated result of fiscal policies 
of the past and may thus enable us to indicate the longer-run influences of  budgetary institutions, 
although the data set lacks a time dimension. 169  Public Debt and Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? 
local community. This variable can itself also play a crucial role in the level of 
local public expenditure. However, its sign is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
more inhabitants will pay for public goods. This reduces cost per capita (tax- 
payer), and it should lead to a lower public debt per capita. On the other hand, 
due to economies of  scale in their provision some public goods will be pro- 
vided only in agglomerations. In this case, the overall level of public expen- 
diture for the agglomeration might increase, and-ceteris  paribus-public 
debt will rise. 
Following Roubini and Sachs, the unemployment rate is included in the 
model. Higher unemployment might trigger higher public debt. The adverse 
shocks of high unemployment result in increasing deficits, and owing to the 
fact that net lending in booms rarely appears they also lead-in  the long run- 
to a higher debt. 
As pointed out above, the bequest motive as altruism between generations 
may not be sufficient to prevent the present generation of taxpayers from dis- 
tributing wealth from future taxpayers by  incurring public debt. As Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1989) as well as Tabellini (1991) have pointed out, the bequest 
motive becomes weaker the larger the spread in the personal income and/or 
wealth distribution. This is in line with a hypothesis by Meltzer and Richard 
(198 l),  who propose that the higher the ratio of average to median income, the 
higher the redistribution that is related to it. Thus, the higher this ratio is, the 
higher the relation between debt and income might be. 
Additionally, the model contains some political variables. The first political 
variable that is included measures the strength of an executive government by 
introducing the number of  coalition parties in the executive. Due to the fact 
that minority governments do not exist in Swiss municipalities, we avoid the 
queries made by  Edin and Ohlsson (1991) with respect to the Roubini and 
Sachs coalition variable. As outlined above, the coalition variable is normally 
expected to have a positive sign; that is, the more political parties are involved 
in the executive, the higher the share of public debt. However, the existence of 
direct democratic decision-making rules at all Swiss government levels has led 
to grand coalitions in Switzerland. Although there is some variation between 
cantons and between municipalities, at least two of the three greatest political 
parties, often even all three, the SP (Social Democrats), the FDP (Liberals), 
and the CVP (Christian Democrats) are part of  the executive. This kind of 
great consensus, called Konkordunz (concordance), renders the grand coalition 
rather normal. We  thus would not expect this variable to have  a significant 
impact. The second political variable follows the arguments of  the partisan 
cycles models that left-wing parties are prone to incur a higher public debt. 
Thus, the share of  left-wing parties in the executive should have  a positive 
impact on the level of public debt. 
Further political variables consist of  the von  Hagen indices on budgetary 
procedures. In contrast to the member countries of the EU, which were investi- 
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for Swiss municipalities. To avoid further aggregation problems, these items 
are introduced separately.**  Since a strong position of the secretary of finance 
in the budget process is supposed to reduce the possibility that the different 
spending branches in the executive will overuse the fiscal commons, the index 
of the structure of negotiations within government is expected to have a nega- 
tive sign. A strong secretary of  finance would-ceteris  paribus-reduce  the 
level of public debt. A higher informativeness of the budget  will reduce the 
time inconsistency problems mentioned by Alesina and Tabellini (1 988), the 
information problems pointed to by Persson and Svensson (1989),  and the fiscal 
commons problem as well. Therefore, the respective index should have a nega- 
tive impact. Finally the index of the long-term planning constraint should also 
have a negative impact since it will also reduce time inconsistency problems. 
The last political variable that is included in the model is a dummy variable 
for direct democracy. It takes on the value of  1 if the executive (or the parlia- 
ment) is controlled by the voters because of an obligatory referendum, an op- 
tional referendum, or a local assembly on the level of the budget deficit, and 0 
otherwise. This holds for 87 of  our observations  (local municipalities).  Be- 
cause of a budgetary referendum the fiscal commons problem is less severe. 
Deficit referenda lead to a lower level of public debt. Moreover, if voters are 
fiscally conservative, that is, if they weigh the future tax burden more heavily 
than the government and/or the parliament, the dummy variable for direct de- 
mocracy should have a negative impact on the amount of public debt. 
Since debt-servicing  costs hardly  vary  between  Swiss municipalities,  we 
cannot use interest rates or some other indicator of  the “cost of the debt.”23 
Instead, one might use the tax rate for the median taxpayer as an indicator of 
the price a citizen has to pay for the public good. The higher the tax rate, the 
lower the level of  public  debt  should be. However,  in the political  process 
people or political decision makers decide not only the size of public debt, but 
about  several fiscal instruments.  Hence,  the tax  rate  is not  an exogenously 
given variable. Public debt is rather the long-run result of fiscal policies, where 
decisions about expenditure and its financing are made. In Swiss local commu- 
nities the latter consists of decisions about the tax rate and about revenue that 
is raised from other sources than taxes. This results in an (annual) surplus or 
deficit and finally in a certain amount of public debt. This implies, however, 
that  we  have  a  simultaneous  decision  in  the  budgetary  process  about  (the 
planned values of) public debt, the tax rate, the share of own public revenue, 
and public expenditure. 
22. Due to the large number of observations we do not have to aggregate the different indices 
to save degrees of freedom, as von Hagen (1992) had to do. 
23. Although default risk may vary between different Swiss municipalities, neither public insti- 
tutions nor the Swiss banks provide any data on it. As Bernard Dafflon indicated to us, both may 
even not have any reliable data since he was asked by Swiss banks to conduct a default risk assess- 
ment of  municipalities of various cantons. Furthermore, depreciation rates of public capital goods 
are legally fixed in the different cantons and vary between municipalities. However, these data are 
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Technically, the result is an econometric model with four equations that have 
to be estimated simultaneously. An estimation of  the structural form is, how- 
ever, impossible, because we do not have the necessary instruments due to the 
pure cross-section design of our data set. On the other hand, as the interesting 
political variables are strongly exogenous-there  has been, for example, no 
change in the constitutional structure during the years preceding our analysis- 
the reduced-form estimates might even be more interesting because they repre- 
sent the long-run effects of these variables. Thus, we estimate the reduced form 
of the system with the (logs of the) following variables: 
Endogenous variables: 
public debt per taxpayer 
tax rate for the median taxpayer 
share of own government revenue from total revenue 
public expenditure per taxpayer 
Exogenous variables: 
average taxable income 
unemployment rate 
number of taxpayers in the municipality 
ratio of average (mean) to median taxable income 
index of structure of negotiations within government 
index of informativeness of the budget 
index of long-term planning constraint 
a dummy variable that takes on the value of  1 if there is direct democratic 
decision making on the budget deficit and 0 otherwise 
share of leftist parties in the executive 
number of parties in the executive 
We estimate this model using a Zellner-Aitken seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) with data for the 131 Swiss municipalities mentioned above for the year 
1990.24  As the sizes of these municipalities are rather different, instead of using 
ordinary least squares, we perform a weighted regression, using the square root 
of the number of taxpayers as weight. 
The results are given in table 7.6. The main result is that the dummy for 
direct democratic decision making  has  a  strong negative  influence on the 
amount of public debt. Moreover, it has also significant impacts on the other 
variables in the system: direct democracy leads-ceteris  paribus-to  a higher 
tax rate of  the median taxpayer, a higher share of  own public revenue, and 
24. Due to the fact that all explanatory variables are included in all equations the simultaneous 
estimates of the coefficients are the same as single equation estimates; only the estimates for the 
variances-and,  thus, also the r-statistics-differ. Table 7.6  Estimates of the SUR-Model for Public Debt, Median Tax Rate, Government Share of Own Revenue, and Public Expenditure 
Dependent Variable 
Log Public  Log Tax Rate of  Log Share of  Log Total Public 
Debt per  the Median  Own Public  Expenditure Per 





Log of average taxable income 
Unemployment rate 
Log number of taxpayers 
Log ratio of average (mean) to 
median taxable income 
Index of structure of government 
negotiations 
Index of budget informativeness 
Index of long-term planning 
Dummy of referenda on budget 
Share of leftist parties in the 






















































































































Note: The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated 1-statistics.  SER is the standard error of the regression, and J.-B. the value of  the Jarque-Bera test on normality of 
the residuals. As weight we use the square root of the number of taxpayers. 
***Significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
**Significantly different from zero at the 5  percent level. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. 173  Public Debt and Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? 
lower public expenditure. In contrast to that, none of the other political vari- 
ables has any significant impact on the size of public debt. The von Hagen 
indices in particular do not influence the level of public debt at all.25  This does 
not imply, however, that these other variables do not have any impact on the 
whole system: Wald tests for the impact on all four equations show a lack of 
significance only in the case of the share of leftist parties. The number of par- 
ties in the executive has a positive impact on the share of own public revenue, 
a negative impact on the median tax rate, and no impact on public debt and 
expenditure. This result is pretty surprising because grand coalitions are the 
rule rather than the exception in Switzerland. The index of structure of negotia- 
tions within government has a negative impact on the tax rate and a positive 
one on the share of own public revenue; the index of informativeness of the 
budget has a negative impact on both the tax rate and the share of own public 
revenue, whereas the index of long-term planning constraint has a negative 
impact on the share of own public revenue as well as public expenditure. 
The log of average taxable income has a strong negative impact on public 
debt: the richer a local community, the less it has to rely on debt financing. 
Richer communities will also-ceteris  paribus-have  higher tax rates for the 
median taxpayer, a higher share of own public revenues, and-astonishingly- 
lower public expenditure per capita.26  The higher unemployment, the higher is 
public debt and the lower the median tax rate. Neither the share of own public 
revenue nor public expenditure is significantly affected by unemployment. The 
population variable has a highly significant positive impact on government ex- 
penditure. Thus, the size of the community matters: A doubling of the number 
of taxpayers raises expenditure per capita by about one-fifth. This clearly re- 
flects that-possibly  due to economies of scale-the  range of public services 
is larger in large than in small communities. Because there is no corresponding 
influence on the revenue side, this also results in significantly higher debt. 
The Meltzermichard-Cukiermafleltzer  variable also matters: the higher in- 
come inequality, the higher is public expenditure, the lower is the median tax 
rate, and, correspondingly, the higher is the public debt. Thus, a higher ratio of 
mean to median incomes induces higher intergenerational redistribution. 
Given the fact that this estimate is a cross section for a share variable, the 
value of the multiple correlation coefficient might be acceptable: We can ex- 
plain about 25 percent of the variance of the dependent variable in the debt 
equation. On the other side, it also clearly indicates that the explanation is far 
from being perfect. The possible factors that have been proposed in the litera- 
ture and are included in this equation leave out some other, perhaps more im- 
portant factors. This holds in a similar way for the other three equations. 
25. A Wald test of the three von Hagen indicators gives x2  = 3.424, of all five other political 
26. Similar (astonishing) results with respect to public expenditure have been derived by Guen- 
variables x2  = 4.224. Both values are far away from any conventional significance level. 
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The Jarque-Bera statistic shows that the normality hypothesis has to be re- 
jected for the estimated residuals in the debt equation at the 5 percent and in 
the expenditure equation even at the  1 percent significance level. In the debt 
equation, this is due to one outlier, the town of Wettingen. In the expenditure 
equation, we see three outliers: Basel, Lugano, and Altdorf. If we exclude these 
four observations from our sample, the coefficients of the variables as well as 
their significance remain largely unchanged. This indicates that our results are 
robust with respect to these outliers. 
Up to now, we have only tested  whether there is a significant difference 
with respect to direct and representative democracy in the constant term of our 
equation. However, it may well be the case that there are also differences in 
other coefficients that may lead to a significantly larger public debt in represen- 
tative versus direct democracies. This might even be the case if we cannot find 
a structural break in this eq~ation.~’  This can be checked if the model is first 
re-estimated  for only the 84 communities with direct democracy and second 
the estimated coefficients are employed to simulate “theoretical” values for the 
47 communities with representative democracy.28 
The result is shown in figure 7.3. For the communities with representative 
democracy, the actual public debt is higher than the theoretical values in 32 
of 47 cases: if we assume that an increase is equally likely as a reduction of 
debt per capita (p  = q = OS),  the probability that an increase occurs in not 
more than  15 municipalities is lower than 2 percent. The simulations show a 
(weighted) average public debt that is 45.2 percent lower than the actual one. 
If we calculate this in absolute terms, we get an average per capita debt that is 
lower by about sFr 10,000 than the actual one. Both of these values are strongly 
significantly different from zero.29  But this result is mainly due to the large 
weight of Zurich, which actually has a rather high debt per capita. Neverthe- 
less, if we exclude this observation, we still get the result that estimated average 
public debt is 23.8 percent lower than the actual one, and if we calculate this 
in absolute terms, we get a value of about sFr 4,500. Both of these values are 
again strongly significantly different from zero.3o  Given an average local public 
debt of sFr 20,400 per capita in Switzerland, this difference is not only statisti- 
cally but also economically significant. 
27. We performed Chow breakpoint tests for this system. If we test only for a break in the first 
equation within this system, we get a X2-statistic of 24.213 with 10 degrees of freedom, which is 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. If we test for all coefficients in this equation 
without the constant term, the value of the test statistic is 13.922, which is not significant at the 
10 percent level. If we test for a structural break in the whole system, we get x2 = 131.392 with 
40 degrees of freedom including the constant terms and xz = 87.403 with 36 degrees of freedom 
excluding the constant terms. Both results are highly significant. 
28. Three of the 87 municipalities in our sample with direct democracy on budget deficits have 
not provided us with an answer on the survey. 
29. The corresponding t-statistics in a weighted regression of the difference between actual and 
simulated values are 6.29 for the logarithmic and 7.24 for the absolute values. 
30. If the observation of Zurich is excluded, the corresponding t-statistics in a weighted regres- 
sion of the difference between actual and simulated values are 3.42 for the logarithmic and 4.87 
for the absolute values. 175  Public Debt and Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? 
Fig. 7.3  Actual and simulated values of public debt (sFr per capita) in 
communities with representative democracy 
Note: White: actual values. Black simulated values. 
7.5  Concluding Remarks 
If we ask for the relative advantages of “bottom up” and “top down” proce- 
dures, the message of our empirical analysis is clear: The “bottom up” proce- 
dure incorporating direct democratic elements seems to be more promising for 
reducing public debt than a “top down” procedure. Elements of  “top down” 
procedures that according to von Hagen (1992) have an impact in representa- 
tive democracies have effects only on the median’s tax rate, own revenue, and 
expenditure, but not on public debt. The voters themselves appear to care more 
about fiscal discipline than their elected representatives, even if  there are no 
such constraints. The problem of fiscal commons is reduced due to the referen- 
dum approval of issuing new public debt. Our results are in line with those for 
the U.S. states reported by  Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996), who have found that 
the referendum requirement poses a strong restriction on the issuance of guar- 
anteed debt. The results point also in the same direction as Matsusaka’s (1995) 
results for the impact of initiatives on public expenditures of the U.S. states. 
Referenda lead to lower public expenditures as well. However, our system esti- 
mates also indicate that taxpayers in municipalities with a deficit referendum 
are prepared to bear the cost of public goods to a larger extent than their parlia- 
mentary counterparts: the tax rate of the median taxpayer and the share of own 
revenue are higher in those municipalities. 
On the other hand, the conventional story that left-wing politicians are more 
likely to increase government debt than their conservative counterparts has not 
been empirically supported. Accepting the evidence from representative de- 176  Lars P.  Feld and Gebhard Kirchgassner 
mocracies  that  supports this empirical  finding, one might conclude that this 
typical “preference” of  left-wing politicians, if it exists at all, can at least be 
neutralized by direct democratic rules: if the heads of the departments in local 
communities are directly elected by the citizens, as in most Swiss cities and 
towns, left-wing candidates might be forced to show the same or perhaps even 
stronger fiscal discipline to be (re-)elected by a majority of “nonleft” citizens 
than their centrist and right-wing competitors. 
Our results, however, do not necessarily contradict the results of von Hagen 
(1992). One reason for the difference could be the small size of  Switzerland 
as compared with most other European countries.31  Of more importance, how- 
ever, might be the fact that the Swiss direct democratic  possibilities  do not 
exist in the member countries of  the EU. In the absence of such possibilities, 
it might well be the case that a budgetary “top down” procedure is to be pre- 
ferred as a second-best solution. With respect to the future fiscal constitution 
of the EU a first best solution should be more eligible. Some aspects von Hagen 
(1992) captures with his indices, like a strong position of the finance minister 
or the informativeness of the budget, might be helpful, but the main impetus 
should be on following the Swiss example and implementing direct democratic 
institutions in the European Union, as has been demanded, for example, by 
Bernholz (1990) or by Feld and Kirchgassner (1996). 
In this context, referenda may also serve their purpose in increasing the ac- 
countability of policy decisions. As Besley and Case (1995) have shown, elec- 
toral accountability in a representative democracy  leads to a more favorable 
fiscal position of U.S. continental states than do gubernatorial term limits. A 
potential referendum on budget deficits additionally induces representatives to 
take the preferences  of  a majority of  voters into account and thus increases 
accountability of policy decisions. The fact that, according to the evidence of 
Bohn and Inman (1996), of the 36 U.S. states with a no-carry-over rule, the 15 
whose supreme courts are appointed by the state’s legislature or governor have 
larger deficits than the 21 states whose supreme courts are elected directly by 
the voters, actually fits this conjecture pretty well. 
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